Judicial review in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy by Koutrakos, P.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Koutrakos, P. (2017). Judicial review in the EU's Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, doi: 10.1017/S0020589317000380 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/18465/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020589317000380
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
 1 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE EU’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
 
PANOS KOUTRAKOS   
 
ABSTRACT 
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was conceived of as a policy area ill-
suited for full judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Lisbon 
Treaty confers on the Court limited jurisdiction which the recent case-law has interpreted in 
broad terms. This article will place this case-law in the broader constitutional setting of the 
EU legal order and will provide a critical analysis of its implications for both the EU’s and 
domestic courts. The analysis is structured on the basis of three main themes. The first is 
about the position of CFSP in the EU’s constitutional architecture: the article will analyse the 
constitutional ambivalence that characterises this position and how it is conveyed by the 
provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union governing the Court’s jurisdiction. The second theme is about the recent 
case-law, and the integrationist approach that the Court of Justice has adopted to the scope 
of its jurisdiction. The third theme is about national courts: the article will argue that recent 
case-law has been too quick to dismiss them, and that primary law renders them an 




Given that it ‘is conventional to think of foreign and security policy as a realm of sovereign 
wills and national interests par excellence’,1 what is the proper role for the judiciary in this 
area? While challenging national legal orders,2 this question was viewed with suspicion in 
the early days of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union 
(EU). The Union’s foreign policy initiatives were considered as short-term, wide-ranging and 
sensitive responses to political crises and, as such, ill-suited for judicial resolution.3 This was 
particularly so in the light of the approach of the European Court of Justice (Court of Justice, 
or the Court) which was viewed as either distinctly constitutionalising or positively 
integrationist in its outlook. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that no role for the Union’s 
judges was envisaged in CFSP matters. 
                                                     
1
 M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law Aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in M Koskenniemi 
(ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) 27 at 27. 
2
 See T Franck, Political Questions, Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (Princeton 
University Press, 1992). For a broader perspective, see T Poole, ‘The Constitution and Foreign Affairs’ in (2016) 
69 Current Legal Problems 143. 
3
 E Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (OUP, 2002) at 312. 
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Things, however, have changed. The gradually evolving scope and implications of 
fundamental human rights have challenged traditional understandings about the impact of 
the rule of law on the conduct of foreign policy.4 As former Advocate General Jacobs put it, 
‘no matter should be automatically a priori excluded from judicial review’.5 The entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 also reframed the terms in which foreign policy was 
designed in the reformed EU. The new constitutional arrangements recalibrated the 
position of CFSP in the Union’s architecture and introduced certain exceptions to the 
absence of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. It has been against this context that the 
question about the role of judicial review in the area has been raised with increasing 
frequency and intensity in the last few years. In its Opinion 2/13 on the Draft Agreement on 
the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Court held 
that, ‘as EU law now stands, certain acts adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the 
ambit of judicial review by the Court of Justice’.6 This statement raised, and left open, the 
question of the delineation of the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
 
The urgency of this question is reflected by the important case-law of both the Court of 
Justice and the General Court of the European Union (the combination of which is referred 
to as ‘the Court of Justice of the European Union’ or ‘CJEU’) in the last three years. This 
case-law will be the main focus of this article. The analysis will be structured along three 
themes. The first is the position of CFSP in the EU’s constitutional architecture: the article 
will analyse the ambivalence that characterises this position and the ways in which it is 
conveyed by the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (both will be referred to as ‘the Treaties’) 
governing the Court’s jurisdiction in CFSP. The second theme is about the recent case-law, 
and the integrationist approach that the Court of Justice has adopted to the interpretation 
of the scope of its jurisdiction. The third theme is about national courts: the article will 
                                                     
4
 See G De Baere, ‘European Integration and the Rule of Law in Foreign Policy’ in J Dickson and P Eleftheriadis 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 354.  
5
 Cited in House of Lords, Select Committee on the EU, The Future Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (HL 2002-03, HL 48) 36 para. 144.  
6
 Opinion 2/13 (Accession to ECHR) EU:C:2014:2454, para. 252. 
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argue that primary law renders them an essential part of the judicial review system 
governing CFSP, and that recent case-law has been too quick to dismiss their role.   
 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: A DEGREE OF AMBIVALENCE? 
 
The scope of CFSP is as close to high politics as a policy area can get. It covers ‘all areas of 
foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence’.7 In legal terms, 
the conduct of CFSP is carried out mainly by three types of decisions: a decision of an 
operational character, adopted under Article 28 TEU in order to define an action to be 
undertaken by the EU (for instance on outreach activities in support of the implementation 
of the Arms Trade Treaty8 or the establishment of a military training mission in Central 
African Republic9); a decision of a non-operation character, adopted under Article 29 TEU in 
order to define the Union’s position on a particular matter (for instance, on the 
International Criminal Court10); a decision defining arrangements for the implementation of 
a prior decision on an action to be undertaken or a position to be taken by the EU. 
 
 The position of CFSP in the Union’s constitutional architecture is characterised by two 
threads that are, at times, in conflict. The first thread is about distinctiveness. The rules 
governing CFSP are not set out in TFEU, along with the provisions governing all the other 
strands of the Union’s external action (Common Commercial Policy, development 
cooperation, economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, 
humanitarian aid, restrictive measures, international agreements, the Union’s relations with 
international organisations and third countries and Union delegations). Instead, they are 
laid down in TEU,11 hence making the CFSP the only substantive policy whose rules are not 
in the TFEU. The Union’s competence, furthermore, is distinguished from the other types of 
EU competences set out in Article 2 TFEU (which lists them as exclusive, shared, 
coordinating, and supporting and supplementing). The CFSP competence, instead, is listed 
                                                     
7
 Art. 24(1) TEU.  
8
 Council Dec. 2017/915/CFSP [2017] OJ 139/38. 
9
 Council Dec. 2016/610/CFSP [2016] OJ L 104/21. 
10
 Council Dec. 2011/168/CFSP  
11
 Title V, Chapter 2 TEU.  
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separately in Article 2(4) TEU. The distinct nature of the set of rules governing this area is 
underlined in Article 24(1) subparagraph 2 TEU, according to which the CFPS ‘is subject to 
specific rule and procedures’. It is also borne out by the applicable institutional structure 
and procedural framework: no legislative acts may be adopted,12 the Council acts, in 
principle, unanimously,13 the right of initiative is shared by the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the Member States,14 the European 
Parliament does not participate in decision-making and its role is extremely limited.15  
 
This thread of distinctiveness is not novel. It was shared both by the precursor to the CFSP, 
that is the European Political Co-operation (EPC),16 which acquired primary law status in the 
Single European Act in 1986, and the rules governing the CFSP prior to the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.17 The organisation of CFSP on the basis of distinct 
characteristics reflects the unique constitutional position of the set of rules governing this 
policy area: it suggests that the special normative features which shaped the sui generis 
nature of the Community legal order and in light of which the Court of Justice had 
pronounced it ‘a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields’,18 were absent from 
the CFSP.  
 
The second thread running through the CFSP rules is about integration in the Union’s overall 
architecture. The Lisbon Treaty reconfigured the Union’s constitutional order by abolishing 
the tripartite pillar structure and, for the first time in the Union's constitutional history, 
                                                     
12
 Art. 24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and Art. 31(1) TEU.  
13
 Art. 24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and Art. 31 TEU.  
14
 Art. 30(1) TEU.  
15
 Art. 36 TEU.  
16
 See S Nuttall, ‘European Political Co-operation and the Single European Act’ (1985) 5 YEL 203, S Perrakis, 
‘L’incidence de l’Acte Unique Européen sur la Coopération des Douze en Matière de Politique Etrangère’, 
(1988) XXXIV AFDI 807. On the legal effect of those provisions, see C Bosco, ‘Commentaire de l’Acte Unique 
Européen des 17–28 Fevrier 1987’ (1987) XXIII CDE 355 at 381, J-P Jacqué, ‘L’Acte unique européen’ (1986) 22 
RTDE 575 at 611. 
17
 See the analysis in E Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2002). 
18
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 at 12. Less than thirty years later, the Court held that the 
Member  
States had limited their sovereign rights ‘within ever wider fields’: Opinion 1/91 (re: Draft EEA Agreement) 
[1991] 
ECR I-6079 at para 21. 
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articulating in Article 21 TEU a set of principles and objectives which govern all external 
policies.19 The CFSP is, therefore, carried out pursuant to a single legal framework and on 
the basis of principles and objectives which it shares with the other strands of the EU’s 
external activities. The significance of this change was highlighted, in another context, by 
the recent Opinion on the conclusion of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement where the 
Court stressed the obligation to integrate these principles and objectives (and, in particular, 
the one about sustainable development) in the Union’s external trade policy.20 In this vein, 
the Treaties introduce for the first time the term ‘external action’ to describe everything 
that the EU does in the world, including in CFSP. The singular term chosen by the drafters of 
the Treaties conveys an understanding of the different strands of the Union’s external 
policies (trade, economic, development, social, political, security) as an integrated whole.  
 
These threads of distinctiveness and integration suggest a degree of ambivalence as to the 
legal position of CFSP in the Union’s constitutional order. This is borne out by the only 
primary provision that tackles the co-existence of CFSP with the other external policies of 
the Union within a single legal framework, that is Article 40 TEU. It reads as follows:  
 
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the 
exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.  
 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of 
the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the 
exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.  
 
The above provision acknowledges the fundamental differences that distinguish the CFSP 
framework from that governing the other strands of the Union’s external action.21 In 
essence, it requires that the distinct procedural and institutional characteristics of CFSP, on 
                                                     
19
 See J Larik, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law (OUP, 2016). 
20
 Opinion 2/15 EU:C:2017:376, paras 140 et seq. 
21
 See also D Thym, ‘The Intergovernmental Constitution of the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Executive’, 
(2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 453. 
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the one hand, and the other external policies of the Union, on the other hand, should not be 
encroached upon. This is imperative, as the above characteristics define the normative 
qualities of the respective legal frameworks in distinct terms. In fact, Article 40 TEU 
highlights this distinction more starkly than the pre-Lisbon constitutional arrangements did: 
the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties included a similar provision, except that it only prevented 
any CFSP measure from impinging upon the Community legal order.22 By amending Article 
40 TEU in order to place CFSP on an equal footing with the other EU policies, the Lisbon 
Treaty underlines the distinct nature of its rules and procedures in the Union’s 
constitutional order.23    
 
The way in which primary law approaches the jurisdiction of the Court on CFSP matters 
reflects the above two threads of distinctiveness and integration. The Treaties set out the 
general jurisdiction of the Court in broad terms: Article 19(1) TEU provides that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed’. There is, however, an exclusion of CFSP matters from the 
Court’s jurisdiction. This has been part of primary law since provisions on foreign and 
security policy were introduced, first in the Single European Act in relation to the European 
Political Co-operation, and then at Maastricht all the way through to Lisbon. This exclusion is 
part of Title V Chapter 2 TEU, entitled ‘Specific provisions on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’, and is laid down in Article 24(1) subparagraph 2 TEU, according to which 
‘[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to 
these provisions …’. It is also laid down in Article 275 TFEU, according to which ‘[t]he Court 
of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions 
relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the 
basis of those provisions’. 
 
Whilst this exclusion has been part of the DNA of the Union’s foreign and security policy, 
CFSP matters were not conceived of as hermetically sealed from all other areas of EU law. 
                                                     
22
 Ex Art. 47 TEU.  
23
 For another understanding of the position of CFSP in the EU’s constitutional order, with emphasis on the 
former as a fully integrated part of the latter, see M Cremona, ‘The CFSP-CSDP in the constitutional 
architecture of the EU’ in S Blockmans and P Koutrakos (eds), Research Handbook on CFSP/CSDP (Elgar 
Publishing, forthcoming). 
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For instance, secondary rules on access to Council documents were held quite early on to be 
applicable, in principle, to documents adopted in the CFSP area as well, as no specific 
exception was laid down thereunder.24 It was the Lisbon Treaty, however, that introduced 
for the first time two exceptions to the CFSP exclusion. The first is about the dividing line 
between CFSP and the other areas of EU law (for instance, this would cover a case where a 
measure adopted under CFSP rules should have been adopted under other EU rules). The 
second exception is about CFSP decisions providing restrictive measures against natural or 
legal persons.  
 
Both exceptions are laid down in Article 24(1) TEU, according to which the Court has 
jurisdiction ‘to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality 
of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union’. The latter provision elaborates further:  
 
 …. the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of the Treaty on European 
Union and to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth 
paragraph of Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive 
measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V 
of the Treaty on European Union. 
 
The first exception, that is monitoring compliance with Article 40 TEU, is of a constitutional 
character. It aims to ensure that the procedural rules set out, on the one hand, in Title V 
TEU governing CFSP, and, on the other hand, the TFEU governing all other aspect of the EU’s  
external action are complied with. Given that these rules differ considerable in terms of the 
applicable decision-making procedure and the ensuing input of the Union’s institutions, 
Article 40 TEU seeks to ensure that a measure that ought to be adopted under CFSP rules is 
not adopted pursuant to TFEU provisions, and vice versa. In doing so, it protects the distinct 
                                                     
24
 See Case T–14/98 Hautala v. Council EU:T:1999:157 paras 41-2, relying on Case T–174/95 Svenska 
Journalistförbundet v. Council EU:T:1998:127 paras 81-3. For the exceptions aiming to protect, amongst others, 
pubic security, defence and military matters and international relations, see Article 4(1) Regulation 1049/2001 
of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council, and 
Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/43. See D Curtin, ‘Official secrets and the negotiation of international 
agreements: Is the EU executive unbound?’, (2013) 50 CMLRev 423 and P Leino, ‘The principle of transparency 
in EU External Relations – Does diplomatic secrecy stand a chance of surviving the age of twittter?’ in M. 
Cremona (ed.), Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Hart Publishing, forthcoming). 
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legal features of CFSP and the other external policies of the Union, as well as the underlying  
powers of the institutions conferred by primary law. Viewed from this angle, the principle 
enshrined in Article 40 TEU is tied in with the principle of institutional balance enshrined in 
Article 13(2) TEU, according to which ‘[each institution shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions 
and objectives set out in in them’.25  
 
By endowing the Court with the jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU, 
Articles 24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and 275 TFEU do not bestow a new power. Instead, they  
acknowledge an existing power, given that it is for the Court of Justice to ascertain whether 
an EU measure is adopted under the appropriate rules and procedures, as these are laid 
down in primary law. After all, even under the previous constitutional arrangements, the 
delimitation between the pillars was part of the Court’s jurisdiction.26   
 
The second exception from the CFSP exclusion is about the protection of fundamental rights 
in general, and the principle of effective judicial protection in particular. It was added in 
primary law by the Lisbon Treaty in the light of the proliferation of smart sanctions, that is 
measures targeting specific individuals or groups of persons or legal entities, as opposed to 
entire countries. As their target is narrower, their aim is to minimise the economic and 
other consequences that they may have for the wider population of a third country. They 
appeared for the first time in the early 1990s and have become popular following the 9/11 
                                                     
25
 On the principle of institutional balance, see for instance Case C-63/12 Commission v Parliament 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:752 at para. 73 and Case C-73/14 Council v Commission (re: ITLOS) ECLI:EU:C:2015:663 at para. 
61. See C Hillion, ‘Conferral, cooperation and balance in the institutional framework of the EU external action’ 
in M. Cremona (ed.), Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Hart Publishing, forthcoming), and P 
Koutrakos, ‘Institutional balance and sincere cooperation in EU external relations law’ (forthcoming). 
26
 On the pre-Lisbon dividing line between the first (EC) and third (PJCCJ) pillars, see Case C-170/96 
Commission v Council (Airport Transit Visa) ECLI:EU:C:1998:219, Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (criminal 
sanctions for environmental violations) ECLI:EU:C:2005:542, Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v 
Council (EU-USA Passenger Name Record Agreement) ECLI:EU:C:2006:346, Case C-440/05 Commission v 
Council (criminal sanctions for ship-sourced pollution) ECLI:EU:C:2007:625. On the pre-Lisbon dividing line 
between the first pillar (in particular development cooperation) and CFSP, see Case C-91/05 Commission v 
Council (Small Arms and Light Weapons) ECLI:EU:C:2008:288 – this is the only case where the Court held that 
ex Article 47 TEU had been violated. The issue was also raised in T-349/99 Miscovic and Karic (about whether a 
CFSP measure ban certain persons from entering the EU territory should have been adopted under EC powers 
on free movement of persons), but the case was removed from the registry. 
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terrorist attacks.27 In the EU context, smart sanctions may take two forms: they may be of 
an economic nature (for instance, freezing assets of persons suspected of financing 
international terrorism), in which case they are implemented by means of EU legislation, or 
they may have a clearer security dimension (for instance, an arms embargo or a ban on the 
entry of individuals in the EU’s territory) in which case they are imposed pursuant to a CFSP 
instrument only. It is the latter that constitutes the subject matter of the second exception 
from the CFSP exclusion under Articles 24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and 275 TFEU.  
 
It follows from the above that the primary rules on the Court’s jurisdiction in CFSP reflect 
the constitutional ambivalence that characterises the position of this policy in the Union’s 
overall structure. The CFSP exclusion and the two exceptions laid down in the Treaties raise 
two questions. First, what is the scope of the exclusion and where does its outer limit lies? 
Secondly, what is the scope of the two exceptions? The following sections will address these 
questions in turn, with reference to the Court’s recent case-law.  
 
III. THE SCOPE OF THE CFSP EXCLUSION  
 
Recent case-law suggests that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction in the area of CFSP in two 
different contexts. The first context is procedural, and is about international agreements on 
CFSP issues and their consistency with the primary rules on the procedures that govern the 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. The Grand Chamber dealt with this 
question in Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council, a case about the EU-Mauritius Agreement 
on the transfer of persons suspected of piracy and arrested by EU staff in the context of the 
Union’s Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia.28 It held that Article 218 TFEU provides 
for ‘a single procedure of general application concerning the negotiation and conclusion of 
international agreements which the European Union is competent to conclude in the fields 
                                                     
27
 See, amongst others, I Cameron (ed.), EU Sanctions: Law and Policy Issues Concerning Restrictive Measures 
(Intersentia, 2013), E Cannizzaro, ‘The EU Antiterrorist Sanctions’ in P Eeckhout and M Lopez-Escudero (eds), 
The European Union’s External Action in Times of Crisis (Hart Publishing, 2016) 324, D Cortright and G.A. Lopez 
(eds), Smart Sanctions – Targeting Economic Statecraft (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), M Eriksson, Targeting 
Peace: Understanding UN and EU Smart Sanctions (Routledge, 2016). 
28
 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025. On the transfer agreements the EU concluded in the context of this operation, see D 
Thym, ‘Transfer Agreements for Pirates Concluded by the EU – a Case Study on the Human Rights 
Accountability of the Common Security and Defence Policy’ in P Koutrakos and A Skordas (eds), The Law and 
Practice of Piracy at Sea – European and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2014) 167. 
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of its activity, including the CFSP, except where the Treaties lay down special procedures’.29 
This conclusion was confirmed subsequently in Case C-263/14 European Parliament v 
Council (about the EU-Tanzania Transfer Agreement).30  
 
The second context is substantive, and is about specific measures adopted by EU bodies in 
the context of CSDP operations and missions. In Case C-439/13 P Elitaliana,31 the Court 
established its jurisdiction on the basis of the award of a public contract by the Head of the 
European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). This decision gave rise to 
expenditures which, in accordance with the Treaties32 and the EU’s Financial Regulation 
applicable at the time,33 were charged to the EU’s general budget. In the light of the above, 
the CFSP measure governing the mission provided that the rules and procedures applicable 
to the budget would also apply to the management of all the mission’s expenditure.34 
According to the judgment, the applicability of the EU’s budget rules entailed the 
jurisdiction of the Court on the application of the EU’s public procurement rules. The CFSP 
exclusion from its jurisdiction was, therefore, not applicable.  
 
More recently, in Case C-455/14 P H,35 the Grand Chamber reached the same conclusion in 
relation to the review of a decision adopted by the Head of Mission of the European Union 
Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The decision was about the deployment 
of an Italian magistrate, seconded to the mission, in a regional office in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Like any other civilian mission carried out by the EU in the context of its security and 
defence policy, EUPM consists of staff seconded from the EU institutions and the Member 
States. A decision by the Head of Mission on allocation of the former at theatre level would 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice pursuant to article 270 TEU and the EU’s 
                                                     
29




 Case C-439/13 P Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo ECLI:EU:C:2015:753 
32
 Art. 41(2) TEU.  
33
 Article 4(2)(a) of Regulation 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the 
European Communities [2010] OJ L 311/9.  
34
 Art. 16(2) Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP [2008] OJ L 42/92, amended by Council Dec. 2011/752/CFSP [2011] OJ 
L 310/10. 
35
 Case C-455/14 P H ECLI:EU:C:2016:569. 
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Staff Regulations.36 The Court held that that should also be the case in relation to decisions 
about the staff seconded from the Member States. This was irrespective of certain 
differences between the two categories of staff (for instance, under the CFSP measures 
governing the Union’s security and defence missions, including EUPM, the staff seconded 
from Member States are under the full command and the disciplinary powers of the 
Member States which also pay for their salaries and expenses).37  
 
The jurisdiction of the Court was substantiated by two main arguments. The first was a 
common feature of the deployment of staff seconded from the EU institutions and the 
Member States: they were both subject to the same rules regarding the performance of 
their duties at theatre level, as they were both under command and control exercised by 
the Head of Mission. Whilst, therefore, they have ‘an operational aspect falling within the 
CFSP’, any decisions about staff allocation at theatre level ‘also constitute, by their very 
essence, acts of staff management, just like all similar decisions adopted by the EU 
institutions in the exercise of their competences’.38 The second argument was about 
coherence: the Court held that, if its jurisdiction did not cover in toto a decision on staff 
allocation at theatre level concerning both staff members seconded by the EU institutions 
and the Member States, the decision on the former may be rendered irreconcilable with the 
interpretation given by the Court to the decision on the latter.    
 
There is a thread that brings together the main rationale of the case-law outlined in this 
section: having construed the exclusion of CFSP from its jurisdiction under Articles 24(1) TEU 
and 275 TFEU as a derogation from the rule of its general jurisdiction (Article 19 TEU), the 
Court interprets the provisions governing this exclusion narrowly.39 This approach to the 
interpretation of rules and exceptions is not novel. It is consistent with a thread that 
underpins other areas of EU law. In relation to the internal market, for instance, it is a 
                                                     
36
 Art. 91 of Council Reg. 259/68 [1968] OJ English Special Edition II p30, amended by Reg. 1080/2010 [2010] 
OJ L 311/1. Article 270 TEU reads as follows: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction 
in any dispute between the Union and its servants within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the 
Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union’. 
37
 For an overview, see P Koutrakos, The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (OUP, 2013) Ch. 6.  
38
 ECLI:EU:C:2016:569, para. 54.  
39
 Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council para. 70, Case C-439/13 P Elitaliana para. 41, C-455/14 P H para. 40). 
This principle was followed by analogy in Case C-72/15 Rosneft ECLI:EU:C:2016:381, paras 74-5. 
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constant that, while the fundamental freedoms are interpreted broadly, the derogations 
laid down in primary law are interpreted strictly.40 The terms, however, in which this rule-
exception principle is couched in the case-law examined in this section reflects the main 
perspective through which the Court is set to approach the question of its jurisdiction. It 
may well be argued that, in fact, it is its jurisdiction in CFSP that is exceptional, the rule 
being the CFSP exclusion laid down in Article 24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and Article 275 TFEU.41 
Such an approach would be consistent with the distinct nature of CFSP in the Union’s 
constitutional order, that is the first theme examined in Section II above. It would, 
therefore, reflect the logic of the exclusion and would suggest that the exceptional 
jurisdiction to rule on compliance with Article 40 TEU and the legality of CFSP decisions 
targeting natural and legal persons would be interpreted narrowly. This, however, was not 
the approach that the Court adopted.42 Instead, by placing the jurisdiction in CFSP against 
the principle of general jurisdiction under Article 19(1) TEU, the case-law is couched in the 
language of integration. It, therefore, reflects the second theme of CFSP law that was 
examined in Section II above, that is integration. 
 
In making this choice about how to approach jurisdiction in CFSP, the case-law produces 
outcomes that vary widely in terms of their fidelity to the spirit of the CFSP exclusion. Take, 
for instance, the judgments in the EU-Mauritius and EU-Tanzania cases. It was not in dispute 
that the primary rules on the treaty-making, laid down in Article 218 TFEU, applied to the 
negotiation and conclusion of CFSP agreements. Each Agreement was concluded by the EU 
by means of a Council Decision to which it was annexed. This Decision was based on Article 
37 TEU (referring to the CFSP substantive provision that covered its content), and Article 
218(5) and (6) TFEU (referring to the procedure governing its adoption). Had the drafters of 
the Treaties wished to render the procedures governing CFSP treaty-making beyond the 
scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, they would have included a specific provision in Title V 
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TEU. They did not. Instead, they set out the applicable procedure beyond the CFSP 
framework, that is in 218 TFEU. Described by Dashwood as ‘the procedural code’ for treaty-
making,43 these provisions govern the negotiation and conclusion of most international 
agreements44 and have been viewed by the Court as ‘an autonomous and general provision 
of constitutional scope in that [Article 218 TFEU] confers specific powers on the EU 
institutions’ and aims to ‘establish … a balance between those institutions’.45 In both cases, 
the jurisdiction of the Court was about compliance with the procedural rules governing the 
Agreements, and did not extend to the substantive provisions of the Agreement itself.  
 
A different picture, however, emerges from the Court’s willingness to affirm its jurisdiction 
on substantive issues pertaining to CFSP. On the surface, both cases outlined above appear 
to be about administrative measures of narrow scope (namely spending in Elitaliana and 
staff management in H). A closer look, however, at their specific context and the line of 
reasoning followed by the Court suggests not only substantial differences, but also a 
creeping expansionist approach to the question of jurisdiction. On the one hand, in 
Elitaliana, there was a crucial link between the CFSP context within which the dispute arose 
and the jurisdiction of the Court, namely the applicability of the Union’s own rules 
governing its budget. As the contested decision was about a tender award, it was, in fact, 
about the application of EU public procurement rules. This link was expressly laid down in 
primary law (Article 41(2) TEU operating expenditure of EU missions), the applicable CFSP 
measure (Joint Action 2008/124), and the EU’s Financial Regulation, all of which provided a 
firm foundation for the non-applicability of the CFSP exclusion.46  
 
On the other hand, such a link was absent in H. Instead, the Court’s jurisdiction was affirmed 
in order to equate the status of staff seconded from Member States to that of EU staff. In 
doing so, however, the judgment engages in interpretative acrobatics, for instance by 
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relying on issues of questionable relevance, such as the duty of all staff to abide by the 
mission-specific minimum security operating standards.47 It also makes a misconceived 
analogy with the status of national experts seconded to the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
and the European External Action Service (EEAS) which is subject to its jurisdiction. In the 
case of these bodies, the legal rules governing their functioning refer specifically to the 
Court’s jurisdiction.48 This was a choice, in other words, that the EU institutions made in 
order to deal with disputes that may arise from the employment of seconded staff. It is far 
from clear how the express conferment of jurisdiction in certain cases might be relied upon 
in order to read the same outcome in the silence of the applicable secondary rules in other, 
different cases. After all, neither EDA nor EEAS may be considered analogous to a CSDP 
mission. The former are permanent administrative bodies whose work pertains to the CFSP 
but whose function is to support policy-formation as a matter of course. The latter are 
about specific initiatives undertaken ad hoc pursuant to the political will of the Council and 
relying on the deployment of staff in order to reach on the ground specific operational 
goals. To draw an analogy between these different bodies is to use a strikingly broad brush 
in order to establish jurisdiction in areas where the drafters of the Treaties require that the 
Court tread carefully.  
 
In essence, the Court’s reasoning in H defined the scope of the CFSP exclusion on the basis 
of a fundamental distinction: staff management decisions fall within the scope of its 
jurisdiction, as they are viewed ‘just like all similar decisions adopted by the EU institutions 
in the exercise of their competences’,49 whereas operational decisions do not. It is this 
distinction that lies at the heart of the judgment. It appears to be similar to the broad 
theory that the Commission had put forward in its submissions. The latter had suggested 
that only CFSP acts expressing the sovereign foreign policy of the Union (analogous to actes 
de gouvernment) would be excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction, whereas acts 
implementing that policy would not be. 
The Court, however, did not articulate the distinction between operational and staff 
management decisions as a general test that would determine the scope of Articles 24(1) 
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TEU and 275 TFEU. It set out it, instead, in the context of the contested decision. It is 
noteworthy, however, that even the Commission had argued that the action was 
inadmissible, because, far from giving effect to an act of implementation, a decision by the 
Head of Mission redeploying a member of staff seconded from a Member State was of an 
operational nature. In its judgment, whilst it did not endorse the Commission’s argument, 
the Court went even farther in certain respects: it held that it would have jurisdiction even 
over a measure that was both of an operational character and about staff management.  
 
The administrative issues that pertained to the dispute in H may appear to be devoid of the 
political sensitivity that characterises the conduct of foreign, security policy and defence. As 
such, they may be considered uncontroversial. This view, however, amounts to a 
generalisation that should be avoided. What appears to be an administrative or 
management issue may also reflect substantive operational choices which are important for 
the conduct of CFPS on the ground. There is, furthermore, no distinction between low and 
high politics inherent in the CFSP exclusion – to introduce it in order to substantiate an 
expansive jurisdiction for the Court sits uneasily with the ratio of the exclusion itself. This is 
all the more so given the broad brush line of reasoning that appears in the judgment in H.  
 
In particular, the conclusion reached by the Court in H is problematic for both legal and 
practical reasons. First, it relies upon a distinction that has no foundation in primary law. 
Reading into Articles 24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU a criterion for determining the outer limits of 
their scope is tantamount to narrowing down their application in ways that the drafters of 
the Treaties did not envisage. This point was made by Advocate General Wahl who, in his 
Opinion, drew attention to the distinction between the broad wording of the CFSP exclusion 
in Articles 24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU and the narrow wording of another primary provision 
restricting the role of the Court of Justice in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice 
(AFSJ), that is Article 276 TFEU.50 Advocate General Wahl, then, argued that, ‘had the 
drafters of the Treaties had the intention of introducing an exception of a more limited 
                                                     
50
 Art. 276 TFEU provides that the Court has no jurisdiction ‘in exercising its powers regarding the [AFSJ] 
provisions … to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-
enforcement services of the Member States or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’.   
 16 
scope to the CJEU’s jurisdiction – essentially confining it to the acts of sovereign foreign 
policy – they would have drafted Articles 24(1) TEI and 275 TFEU differently’.51 
 
Secondly, the criterion upon which the Court relied is difficult to apply in practice. This point  
was also  made by Advocate General Wahl in his thoughtful Opinion where he argued that, 
‘given the nature and functioning of CFSP’, acts of implementation ‘may often be of great 
political significance and sensitivity’, hence making it ‘difficult to determine the 
administrative element of the act without taking into account the underlying foreign policy 
objective pursued’.52 The dispute in H was about a decision of the Head of Mission regarding 
the deployment of a magistrate from one place to another. If such a decision were not 
operational in nature, it would be difficult to envisage what type of decision would be. In 
fact, the judgment uses the term ‘allocation of human resources assigned to [the Mission] 
by the Member States and the EU institutions’.53 Leaving aside the use of management 
jargon that should be avoided at all cost in any context, let alone by the Court of Justice, 
these words reflect the broader tenor of the judgment that ends up downgrading the 
operational, and hence sensitive, nature of staff decisions taken in CSDP missions in order to 
assimilate them to management measures.   
 
It is not, however, only the conclusion reached by the judgment in H that is problematic. 
The line of reasoning is also unconvincing. The Court justified its jurisdiction to rule on a 
Head of Mission’s decision regarding the deployment of staff seconded from a Member 
State by reference to its jurisdiction to rule on a decision regarding the deployment of EU-
seconded staff. As the Head of a Mission might well take a decision about both types of 
staff, ‘irreconcilable’ differences would emerge unless the Court’s jurisdiction extended to 
both. It is not the first time that, in order to extend its jurisdiction, the Court has relied upon 
this type of argument that purports to protect the Union’s legal order from potential 
incoherence in the future. It did so in the context of mixed agreements. These are 
international agreements concluded by both the EU and the Member States because their 
content falls within the competence of both. The question arose early on about whether 
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such agreements would fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, in particular as far as their 
provisions covered by national competence were concerned. The case-law dealing with this 
issue is not burdened by clarity, and its analysis is beyond the scope of this article.54 Suffice 
it to point out that, gradually, the Court interpreted the scope of its jurisdiction widely by 
following a line of reasoning that reminds one of the judgment in H. A case in point is the 
judgment in Case C-53/96 Hermès where it was held that the interpretation of a provision of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), that is a 
mixed agreement, regarding provisional measures fell within the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction even in a dispute about a national trademark.55 This was because the TRIPS 
provision in question was also applicable to EU secondary legislation on trademarks, and, 
therefore, ‘it is clearly in the Community interest that, in order to forestall future 
differences of interpretation, that provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the 
circumstances in which it is to apply’.56 This was, in essence, the logic underpinning the 
judgment in H: if the Court had jurisdiction to interpret a decision of the Head of Mission in 
certain respects (as regards EU-seconded staff), its jurisdiction should extend to the entirety 
of the decision (as regards staff seconded from the Member States too), for, otherwise, 
‘irreconcilable’ differences of interpretation might emerge.  
 
This approach was not convincing in the context of the mixed agreements in the 1990s, and  
is not convincing in the context of CFSP measures almost twenty years later. It is not for the 
Court to ensure the coherence of administrative decisions adopted by the CSDP personnel 
on the ground. And it cannot be for the Court to superimpose its own idea of coherence on 
the administrative structures designed by the Member States in foreign policy, security, and 
defence. Were such differences to emerge, it would be for the Union’s organs (the Head of 
Mission, the Civilian Operation Commander, the Political and Security Committee, and, 
ultimately, the High Representative) to address them. By using this interpretative device in 
order to extend the scope of its jurisdiction, the Court of Justice usurps a power that the 
institutional structure of the Treaties do not bestow upon it. Its approach also runs counter 
to the logic of the system of judicial review established in primary law in relation to CFSP. In 
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the words of Advocate General  Wahl in H: ‘[t]hat system is, in fact, the result of a conscious 
choice made by the drafters of the Treaties, which decided not to grant the CJEU general 
and absolute jurisdiction over the whole of the EU Treaties. The Court may not, accordingly, 
interpret the rules set out in the Treaties to widen its jurisdiction beyond the letter of those 
rules or to create new remedies not provided therein’.57 
 
The analysis so far of the case-law on the scope of the CFSP exclusion illustrates an 
approach couched in the language of integration that underestimates the nuances of the 
conduct of CFSP and marginalises the distinct position of this policy in the Union’s 
constitutional order.  Two questions arise about the specific implications of this case-law.  
First, would the broad approach to the procedural dimension of CFSP agreements also apply 
to their substance? In other words, does the jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the 
procedural rules laid down in Article 218 TFEU also extend to the substance of CFSP 
agreements and their compliance with substantive EU law? This question has not been 
addressed so far, as the judgments in Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council (EU- Mauritius)58 
and Case C-263/14 European Parliament v Council (EU-Tanzania) were confined to 
procedural issues and the choice of legal basis. The answer to this question is not clear cut. 
On the one hand, the procedural legal basis for the negotiation and conclusion of CFSP 
agreements is laid down in Article 218 TFEU, a provision that is subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Furthermore,   such agreements are not expressly excluded from the a priori 
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 218 (11) TFEU to rule on the compatibility of 
international agreements with the Treaties.59 In fact, most members participating in the 
drafting of the Constitutional Treaty, the CFSP provisions of which are mirrored in the Lisbon 
Treaty, shared the view that CFSP agreements fell within the scope of the a priori 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU.60  If the latter was accepted, it would be 
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difficult to rule out the ex post facto jurisdiction in the context of a preliminary reference or 
an annulment action.61 On the other hand, to extend the jurisdiction to CFSP international 
agreements may not sit comfortably with the wording and underlying logic of the CFSP 
exclusion in Article 24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and Article 275 TFEU. Whilst concluded under 
Article 218 TFEU, CFSP international agreements are also concluded under Article 37 TEU: it 
is the latter that provides the substantive legal basis for the conclusion of such agreements 
and which, without doubt, falls beyond the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to the 
CFSP exclusion. A balance could be struck by construing the jurisdiction of the Court 
narrowly: this approach would confine judicial review of CFSP agreements to procedural 
questions about their negotiation and conclusion. This view would, therefore, read into 
Article 218(11) TFEU a limitation which, whilst not expressly set out therein, would reconcile 
this provision with Article 24(1) paragraph 2 and Article 275 TFEU. It would also, however, 
reduce the significance of the Court’s a priori jurisdiction considerably.   
 
The second question about the Court’s broad approach to the scope of the CFSP exclusion is 
whether it would also extend to the scope of the two exceptions laid down in Articles 24(1) 
paragraph 2 TEU and 275 TFEU. This will be answered in the following sections which deal, 
in turn, with the substantive and procedural aspects of these provisions.       
 
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTIONS FROM THE CFSP EXCLUSION  
 
It is recalled that the first exception from the CFSP exclusion from the Court’s jurisdiction is 
about compliance with Article 40 TEU. It aims to ensure that the procedures and 
institutional powers laid down in the Treaties are complied with: in other words, a CFSP 
measure should not be adopted pursuant to non-CFSP provisions, and vice versa. As for the 
second exception, it is about CFSP decisions imposing restrictive measures on natural or 
legal persons. Whilst the definition of this term is not provided in Article 24(1) paragraph 2 
TEU, or Article 275 TFEU, its implications are considerable: the broader its scope, the 
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narrower the CFSP exclusion from the Court’s jurisdiction and the broader the role of the 
Court of Justice in the area. 
 
There is no case-law since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in which a violation of 
Article 40 TEU has been affirmed.62 In fact, whilst questions have been raised before the 
Court about either the input of the Parliament in the adoption of a CFSP Agreement,63 or 
the scope of the CFSP dimension of an agreement concluded under CFSP rules,64 there has 
only been one case where the issue of compliance with Article 40 has been raised directly. 
This was in Rosneft,65 a case about sanctions in which the Court also defined the term ‘CFSP 
decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons’.  
 
In order to appreciate the legal issues underpinning the construction of these exceptions 
and which were raised in Rosneft, it is worth outlining the procedure pursuant to which the 
EU imposes restrictive measures. It entails two stages. The first is about the determination 
by the Council of the political will of the Union to impose such measures. This is expressed 
in a CFSP measure adopted unanimously by the Council in accordance with the provisions 
governing the CFPS (Chapter 2, Title V TEU). Once this measure has been adopted, the 
second stage of the procedure is triggered: the Council adopts by qualified majority ‘the 
necessary measures’ setting out in detail the restrictive measures envisaged in the prior 
CFSP measure (Article 215 TFEU).  
 
This two-stage procedure aims to bring together the foreign policy and economic dimension 
of restrictive measures and the distinct sets of EU rules that govern them. As such, it is not 
novel, and has its origin in the Maastricht Treaty.66 The Lisbon Treaty, however, provided, 
for the first time, an express legal basis for the adoption of restrictive measures against 
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natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities following the adoption of a CFSP 
decision to that effect (Article 215(2) TFEU).  
 
The two-stage procedure outlined above is relied upon in cases where the restrictive 
measures that the EU decides to impose pertain to the areas covered by the Union’s 
competence pursuant to the TFEU provisions. The Union, however, may also impose 
restrictive measures that are not covered by the TFEU provisions and, therefore do not 
require recourse to the Article 215 procedure. Such measures include, amongst others, 
restrictions on the entry and transit of persons, or arms embargoes.   
 
The judgment in Rosneft was about restrictive measures imposed by the EU following the 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and in the light of Russia’s role in the destabilisation of 
the security situation in Ukraine. The Union imposed a set of restrictive measures the scope 
and intensity of which expanded gradually. In particular, Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP67 
and accompanying Regulation 833/201468 imposed restrictions on certain financial 
transactions and on the access of some Russian entities to EU capital markets, and on the 
export of some goods, technology and services required for oil transactions. Rosneft is a 
company specialising in the oil and gas sectors. It is incorporated in Russia and the majority 
of its capital owned by a body owned by the Russian State. It challenged the above 
measures both before the High Court in England and Wales (where it also challenged UK 
implementing measures) and the General Court of the EU.69  
 
The judgment dealt with both exceptions from the CFSP exclusion. The significance of these 
issues was illustrated by the fact that the judgment was rendered by the Grand Chamber. In 
relation to the first exception, that is compliance with Article 40 TEU, the Court held that the 
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CFSP measure targeting Rosneft was correctly adopted pursuant to CFSP rules,70 even 
though its content was detailed and reproduced in the contested Regulation. Given, on the 
one hand, the technical nature of the field, and, on the other hand, the wide scope of CFSP 
aims and objectives in the Treaties,71 ‘it may prove appropriate for the Council to use 
detailed wording when establishing restrictive measures’ in a CFSP decision, without, 
therefore, impinging on the different procedure governing the implementing measure 
under Article 215 TFEU.72 The Court also held that the contested Decision had not 
amounted to a legislative act (which the EU is prevented from adopting in the CFSP field 
pursuant to Articles 24(1) subparagraph 2 and 31 TEU): as the division of institutional 
powers in CFSP decision-making differs from that governing the adoption of legislative acts 
under TFEU rules, the application of the former suggested that the contested Decision was 
not a legislative measure.  
 
The analysis of the issue of compliance with Article 40 TEU in Rosneft illustrates a generous 
approach to the decision-making institutions. The broad discretion that the latter enjoy in 
CFSP, along with the broad scope of the policy, suggest considerable leeway in policy-
making. They also suggest a corresponding reluctance on behalf of the Court to interfere 
with the substance of the choices made by the institutions. This is illustrated by the light 
touch review of the content of the contested Decision in the judgment. It is also reflected by 
the formalist and somewhat circular response to the legislative act claim: does reliance 
upon the CFSP procedures really suggest ipso facto that the measure adopted thereunder is 
not a legislative act? Cremona argues that the Court approaches Article 40 TEU in a hands-
off manner: once a CFSP legal basis is chosen by the EU institutions, it is difficult to 
challenge.73 In fact, the judgment in Rosneft does not introduce strict criteria that the 
content of CFSP measures must meet in order to justify their adoption under CFSP rules.  
 
As for the second exception from the CFSP exclusion, the Court defined restrictive measures 
against natural or legal measures in the meaning of Article 275 TFEU as measures the scope 
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of which is determined by reference to objective criteria and which, rather than targeting 
identified natural or legal persons, are applicable generally.74 The provisions, therefore, of 
the contested Decision subjected certain activities to restrictive measures would not be 
covered by the Court’s jurisdiction, even if only a handful of legal persons were in a position 
to carry out the activities in question. On the other hand, the provisions of the contested 
Decision that refer expressly to specific legal persons constitute measures targeting the 
latter and, as such, would fall within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. It is ‘the individual 
nature’ of such CFSP restrictive measures that trigger access to the Union’s Courts.75 
 
In Rosneft, the Court reached different conclusions in relation to the two exceptions from 
the CFSP exclusion: does this suggest a different approach, more generous when it comes to 
choosing a CFSP legal basis, but more rigorous when it comes to CFSP restrictive measures 
on individuals? In order to answer this question, we should revisit the distinction between 
the two exceptions made in Section II above. On the one hand, compliance with Article 40 
TEU is about the constitutional position of CFSP in the EU’s legal order: the rules and 
procedures laid down in Title V TEU differ from those governing all the other external 
policies, as they reflect the different logic on the basis of which CFSP is organised. In other 
words, compliance with Article 40 TEU is about ensuring that CFSP rules have been relied 
upon properly and not in order to usurp powers allocated to EU institutions under non-CFSP 
rules. Put differently, this is about the first choice that decision-makers need to make, as it is 
about deciding upon which set of primary rules to rely. On the other hand, the adoption of 
CFSP decisions providing restrictive measures against natural or legal persons has an impact 
on the human rights of these persons. The Court’s jurisdiction extends to the first issue 
because it is for the Court, as a constitutional adjudicator, to rule on the co-existence of the 
different sets of rules that govern what the Union does. In the second case, however, the 
Court’s jurisdiction is triggered once the Union has acted pursuant to CFSP and without 
calling into question the reliance upon CFSP powers. This is, in other words, about the 
implications of the first choice that decision-makers have made: once reliance on CFSP has 
been decided, the protection of the human rights of the targeted persons is monitored by 
extending the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.   
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Viewed from the above angle, there is no contradiction in Rosneft: the EU institutions were 
given leeway to decide how to act pursuant to CFSP rules; once, however, they acted by 
targeting private and legal persons, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice would be 
triggered. The conclusion reached by the Court should also be examined in its proper factual 
and legal context.  The measures at issue in Rosneft were not as controversial as they might 
be, given that the mentioned expressly a number of entities, including the applicant, in an 
Annex and, by reference, in a number of provisions. Would they still fall within the scope of 
Article 275 TFEU if they merely defined in a specific manner certain criteria that only a very 
small number of entities could meet, even though the latter were not mentioned? The 
Court in Rosneft held that, ‘by establishing the criteria …., allowing the identification of 
Rosneft, and by naming that company in Annex III to that decision, the Council adopted 
restrictive measures against the legal person concerned’.76 These issues may be explored 
further in the future, as the interpretation of the scope of restrictive measures against 
natural or legal persons under Article 275 TFEU is not settled.77 
 
V. THE PROCEDURAL SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTIONS  
 
Having explored the interpretation of the substantive aspects of the two exceptions from 
the CFPS exclusion from the Court’s jurisdiction, the question that is raised is about the 
procedural mechanisms on the basis of which this jurisdiction may be exercised. This was 
addressed in Rosneft. It is worth recalling that, in the EU legal order, the review of legality of 
acts adopted by the Union’s institutions is decentralized. Private parties may bring 
proceedings directly before the General Court and, on appeal, the European Court of Justice 
on the substantive grounds laid down in Article 263 subparagraph 1 TFEU, provided that 
they meet strict locus standi conditions (Article 263 subparagraph 4 TFEU). The legality of 
EU acts, however, may also be challenged before domestic courts.78 Given that the latter 
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are precluded from invalidating EU law,79 they must make a preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU if they have doubts about the legality of an EU act. 
These two procedural avenues, namely annulment actions and preliminary references, are 
viewed as intrinsically linked and amount to ‘a complete system of legal remedies and 
procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of acts of the institutions’.80 
 
In the light of the above, the question is raised whether the limited jurisdiction of the Court 
in CFSP matters may be applied in actions that are brought before the Court of Justice both 
directly, under Article 263 TFEU, and indirectly, under Article 267 TFEU. As far as the first 
exception to the CFSP exclusion is concerned, that is monitoring the application of Article 40 
TEU, the Treaties are silent. Neither Article 24 (1) TEU, nor Article 275 TFEU refer to a 
specific  procedural mechanism. Things are, however, different in relation to  CFSP decisions 
providing restrictive measures against natural or legal persons: Article 24(1) TEU provides 
for the jurisdiction ‘to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second 
paragraph of Article 275 [TFEU]’. The latter provides, in turn, that the Court has jurisdiction 
‘to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth 
paragraph of Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality’ of CFSP decisions providing for 
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. Does the silence of the above 
provisions suggest that a claim for a violation of Article 40 TEU could be brought before the 
Court of Justice under either the preliminary reference and the annulment procedure? And 
does the reference to annulment actions only in relation to CFSP measures targeting private 
parties suggest that the Court would not have jurisdiction in preliminary references?  
 
The Grand Chamber answered these questions in the affirmative. In relation to Article 40 
TEU, it held that the absence of a reference to ‘any particular means by which such judicial 
monitoring is to be carried out’ suggested that the general jurisdiction of the Court, under 
Article 19 TEU, would apply.81 Given that Article 19(3)(b) TEU referred specifically to its 
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jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings, that also covered questions by national courts on the 
validity of CFPS measures under Article 40 TEU. 
 
More controversially, the Court reached the same conclusion for the legality of CFSP 
decisions providing restrictive measures to natural and legal persons. This was substantiated 
on a number of arguments. The first argument was contextual: it was about the 
‘complementary’ nature of the procedures governing annulment actions and preliminary 
references, and the ensuing establishment of ‘a complete system of legal remedies and 
procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of European Union acts’ which 
has been ‘entrusted … to the Courts of the European Union’.82 As it is ‘inherent in that 
complete system’ that the validity of an EU measure may be raised before a domestic court, 
and given that a request for a preliminary ruling on such a matter constitutes a means of 
reviewing the legality of EU acts, ‘that essential characteristic of the system for judicial 
protection in the European Union extends to the review of the legality’ of CFSP decisions 
imposing restrictive measures on  natural or legal persons.83   
 
The second argument was textual: the Court held that the Treaties provided no indication 
that preliminary references should be excluded from its exceptional jurisdiction to review 
CFSP measures. The express mention of Article 263 TFEU in Article 275 TFEU was not 
considered relevant, as the latter provision was referred to in Article 24(1) second 
subparagraph TEU ‘in order to determine not the type of procedure under which the Court 
may review the legality of certain decisions, but rather the type of decisions whose legality 
may be reviewed by the Court, within any procedure that has as its aim such review of 
legality’.84  
 
The third argument was about the central role of the Member States in CFSP measures. 
Member States are partly responsible for the implementation of restrictive measures and 
they are under a duty to ensure that their policies conform with the EU’s position enshrined 
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in CFSP decisions.85 Access, therefore, to judicial review of such decisions ‘is indispensable 
where those decisions prescribe the adoption of restrictive measures against natural or 
legal persons’, and a reference for a preliminary ruling, ‘plays an essential part in ensuring 
effective judicial protection’.86 
 
The fourth argument was about general principles. On the one hand, the Court referred to 
the rule of law, that is one of the EU’s founding values under Article 2 TEU, one of the 
common provisions of the TEU. The rule of law is also amongst the principles that guide the 
Union’s external action under Article 21 TEU, the latter provision applying to the CFSP too 
(Article 23 TEU). On the other hand, the principle of effective judicial protection is enshrined 
in Article 47 of the Charter87 and is essential for the rule of law. While it acknowledged that 
that provision could not confer jurisdiction where primary law excludes it, the Court held 
that ‘the principle of effective judicial protection nonetheless implies that that exclusion of 
the Court’s jurisdiction in the field of the CFSP should be interpreted strictly’.88 
 
The fifth argument was about the general jurisdiction of the Court under Article 19(1) TEU: a 
strict interpretation of the exceptional jurisdiction conferred by Article 275 TFEU, to which 
Article 24(1) TEU refers, would be contrary to the objectives of Article 19(1) TEU, as well as 
the principle of effective judicial protection.   
 
The final argument was about national courts. Their role was dismissed as contrary to ‘the 
necessary coherence of the system of judicial protection’ which requires that only the Court 
of Justice should have jurisdiction to declare EU acts void, and the essential objective of the 
preliminary reference procedure, that is to ensure the uniform application of EU law by 
domestic courts.89  
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The judgment in Rosneft followed the thread that had emerged in H and extended it both 
boldly and considerably. The perspective of the judgment is distinctly integrationist. For 
instance, the starting point of the Court’s analysis is not the logic of the CFSP exclusion or 
the distinct position of the CFSP in the Union’s constitutional order. Instead, the judgment 
starts off by referring to the establishment of the complete system of judicial remedies for 
the review of the legality of EU acts. This methodological choice reflects the integrationist 
character of the judgment which is also illustrated by the strengthening of the narrow 
reading of the CSFP exclusion that the Court put forward. Whilst in H this was based on the 
exceptional nature of the exclusion, the judgment in Rosneft adds the principle of effective 
judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, as yet another argument to that 
effect. In doing so, not only does the Court develop further the main theme of its approach 
to its exceptional jurisdiction, but it also introduces a human rights perspective to it: the 
extension of the procedural mechanisms on the basis of which its jurisdiction could be 
exercised is presented as essential to ensuring respect for fundamental human rights. The 
judgment, therefore, provides a richer conception of the Court’s role in CFSP matters. It 
also, suggests a degree of normalisation of CFSP in so far as it brings its rules closer to the 
mainstream legal principles that apply to the other areas of EU law in general, and EU 
external action in particular.  
 
In essence, the integrationist logic of the judgment in Rosneft is based on the notion that 
the validity of CFSP decisions over which the Court has jurisdiction (that is those which 
provide restrictive measures for private and legal persons) may only be reviewed by the 
Court of Justice. This is made clear by the emphasis on Foto-Frost and the main 
constitutional principle of judicial review that that judgment introduced, according to which 
national courts are  prevented from declaring EU measures invalid. Striving to avoid 
potential conflicts between national courts and the Court of Justice is a sensible task and a 
worthwhile and optimal policy objective. The question, however, is whether, attractive 
though it may be, this outcome in this specific policy context is consistent with primary law.   
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The answer to this question is negative. The integrationist logic of the judgment in Rosneft is 
based on a selective reading of the Treaties. The textual argument misconstrues the 
wording of Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275 TFEU: the former provision qualifies the 
reference to ‘certain decisions’ that fall within the Court’s jurisdiction ‘as provided for by 
the second paragraph of Article 275 [TFEU]; and the latter refers expressly to ‘proceedings, 
brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 
[TFEU]’. The wording of Article 24(1) subparagraph 2 TEU, therefore, provides no indication 
that an annulment action would constitute merely an example of the procedure aiming to 
review the legality of CFSP measures.90 The judgment promotes its effet utile interpretation 
by other similarly questionable arguments. The significance, for instance, of Article 267 
TFEU is an observation about the system of judicial review in the EU legal order, but does 
not amount to an argument in order to read the procedure into the exceptional scheme of 
review reserved in the Treaties for CFSP measures. If anything, the argument could be the 
reverse: rather than relying upon the objectives of the preliminary reference procedure in 
order to extend jurisdiction, the Court could have relied on the objectives of the CFSP 
exclusion and the two related exceptions in order to determine the applicability of the 
preliminary reference procedure. The Court refrained from making the latter choice, hence 
underlining the language of integration into which the judgment was couched.   
 
In this vein, the Court’s reference to the central role of the Member States in the 
implementation of CFSP measures was one-dimensional: it ignored its relevance not only to 
the construction of CFSP as a distinct policy area, albeit within the system of the Union’s 
integrated external action, but also to the very exclusion of that area from the jurisdiction of 
the Court. It is precisely because of the position of the Member States as the main locus of 
power in the design and implementation of CFSP that the EU’s Courts have only been 
endowed with exceptional and limited powers. To rely on this feature of CFSP in order to 
extend the scope of the Court’s powers was disingenuous.  
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The broad construction of the Court’s jurisdiction may appear uncontroversial in the context 
of a foreign policy system understood as ‘unfinished’, ‘incomplete’, and ‘in a process of 
transition to the finite and attainable ideal of integrating more fully into the mainstream of 
European Union law’.91 After all, the case law examined in this article reflects the logic of 
the normalisation of the policy, and contributes to the deeper integration of CFSP in the 
mainstream of EU law. The choice, however, of integration should come from the drafters 
of the Treaties, rather than the Courts.  
 
The judgment in Rosneft is not the only instance where the Court has been keen to extend 
the scope of the preliminary reference procedure to areas of policy-making that the drafters 
of the Treaties sought to keep somewhat apart. Under the Nice Treaty, jurisdiction in the 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (the so-called third pillar, PJCCM) was 
limited: it was subject to certain conditions and, in any case, did not cover common 
positions (an instrument that the Lisbon Treaty abolished). Given that it had jurisdiction to 
rule on the legality of any PJCCM measure other than common positions, the Court held in 
Gestoria and Segi that it also had jurisdiction to rule on the validity and interpretation of a 
common position parts of which ought to have been adopted by another PJCCM measure.92 
This approach appears similar to that adopted in Rosneft. There is, however, an important 
distinction: in Gestoria and Segi, the application of the preliminary reference procedure was 
sanctioned in primary law and extended in case-law in order to cover a measure which, for 
all intends and purposes, ought to have been adopted under a different nomenclature and 
procedure; in Rosneft, the Court introduced the preliminary reference in an area not 
provided for expressly under primary law.93  
 
The above analysis of the judgment in Rosneft suggests that, in interpreting the procedural 
aspects of its exceptional powers over CFSP decisions targeting individuals, the Court has 
extended its jurisdiction contrary to the wording of the Treaties and the ratio of Article 
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24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and Article 275 TFEU. The question that is, then, raised is whether 
this bold approach to jurisdiction is matched by a similarly bold approach to adjudicating on 
the substance of the dispute.  
 
The answer is negative. In fact, the judgment in Rosneft is characterised by a balance 
between principle and pragmatism. Once it had construed its jurisdiction widely, the Court 
went on to  
to dismiss all the claims made by the applicant, that is the target of the Union’s restrictive 
measures in question. This was due to the objectives of the latter, namely the promotion of 
a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Ukraine, which was held to be consistent with the 
objectives of the Union’s external action set out in Article 21 TEU. These objectives 
rendered the restrictions on the fundamental human rights of Rosneft regarding the 
conduct of their business and their property both inevitable and legitimate. Furthermore, as 
the effective achievement of these objectives involved making political, economic and social 
choices on the basis of complex assessments, the EU’s institutions enjoyed broad discretion 
to that effect. It was for that reason that neither the principle of proportionality nor that of 
equal treatment had been violated, as no manifest violation was substantiated.94  
 
This balance between boldness on the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction and caution on its 
exercise may appear to suggest that the overall approach emerging from the judgment in 
Rosneft would not pose any threat to the distinct nature of CFSP. In other words, the 
Union’s Judges would respect the leeway that the EU’s decision-making institutions enjoy 
under Title V TEU, and, in principle, would not interfere unduly with their policy choices. 
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Such a suggestion would be far from outlandish.95 In the context of trade measures with 
foreign policy implications, for instance, it was argued early on that, whilst it was keen to 
construe the scope of EC law, as it then was, broadly, the Court was loath to interfere with 
the substantive policy choices made by the EU’s institutions in the field of foreign and 
security policy.96  
 
The above qualification, however, ought to be assessed against three broader issues raised 
by the case-law examined in this section. The first is about the wording of the Treaties and 
the logic of the CFSP exclusion from the Court’s jurisdiction: the approach adopted by the 
case-law is quite creative with the former and selective with the latter. Whilst it reflects the 
integration of CFSP in the Union’s revamped constitutional order at Lisbon, the case-law is 
less concerned with conveying the distinct position of the policy that Article 24(1) paragraph 
2 TEU and Article 275 TFEU illustrate. This approach sits uncomfortably not only with the 
wording of these provisions, but also with the choice of the drafters of the Tresties about 
the role of the EU Courts that they convey.  
 
Secondly, the case-law examined so far requires that the Member States show faith, and 
trust the Court to exercise its broadly construed jurisdiction with appropriate deference to 
the substantive policy choices that the EU institutions make. This leap of faith could 
compensate them for the greater involvement in CFSP that the Court has read into the 
Treaties. This leap of faith, however, entails uncertainty, as it would rely upon the EU Judges 
to take it upon themselves on a case by case basis to respect the broad discretion that is 
inherent in the conduct of CFSP.  
 
Thirdly, the case-law examined so far equates impliedly judicial review with the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU, and is too quick to dismiss a role for national courts in the context 
of legality review for CFSP measures. This approach is narrow and at odds with the 
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prominent role of national courts in the Union’s legal order. This argument will be explored 
in the following section.  
VI. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS 
 
The article so far has analysed the integrationist approach that emerges from the case-law 
on the Court’s jurisdiction in CFSP. The role of domestic courts, however, as an alternative 
locus for judicial review is worth exploring. This is for two main reasons: it highlights a viable 
alternative that the case-law has ignored, and also explores the options open to applicants 
in cases where the Court has no jurisdiction under Articles 24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU. After all, 
the broad interpretation of its scope notwithstanding, there are areas in CFSP policy which 
the Court’s jurisdiction may not reach, such as a CFSP decision that does not provide for 
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. While the role of domestic courts has 
not been addressed by the Court of Justice, as the broad approach that it adopted in its 
case-law rendered an answer redundant, it is, nonetheless, significant for the functioning of 
the CFSP framework. This is all the more so, given, on the one hand, the central role of the 
Member States in the implementation of CFSP measures. 
 
In addition to questions of validity and interpretation, the role of national courts is also 
raised  in the context of actions for damages. Article 275 (1) TFEU does not refer to this 
remedy. And whilst it read its jurisdiction in preliminary references into the provision for 
annulment proceedings in Articles 24(1) TEU and 275(1) TFEU, the Court’s interpretative 
ingenuity may not be able to stretch so far as to cover damages actions too. The General 
Court held in T-328/14 Jannatian that the above provisions rule out an action for damages 
from the CJEU’s jurisdiction.97 This conclusion confirmed the pre-Lisbon case-law, according 
to which both the Court of First Instance, as it then was, and the Court of Justice had held 
that such an action in the third pillar (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Law) was 
manifestly inadmissible.98 The argument to the contrary99 is not supported by either the 
wording or the context of Articles 24 TEU and 275 TFEU. 
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The starting point for our analysis of the role of national courts is the applicability of the rule 
of law and fundamental human rights to CFSP as a matter of EU law. Article 2 TEU makes it 
clear that these are included in the values on which the EU legal order is founded. This 
provision forms part of the General Provisions of TEU and, therefore, applies to all EU 
policies, including the CFSP. As fundamental human rights are protected in the EU legal 
order pursuant to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) 
which has the status of primary law,100 and given that the Charter’s provisions ‘are 
addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’ (Article 51 Charter), 
without ruling out specific areas of activities, it follows that the Charter is applicable to CFSP 
measures.101 This has specific implications for the legality of what the EU does in the area. 
As the Court of Justice put it in Segi, the applicability of the rule of law suggests that ‘the 
institutions are subject to review of the conformity of their acts with the treaties and the 
general principles of law, just like the Member States when they implement the law of the 
Union’.102 It is noteworthy that, whilst rendered in the pre-Lisbon days, that was a judgment 
by the Grand Chamber in the context of the second and third pillar where the Court had no 
and limited jurisdiction respectively. The above conclusion is also supported by other 
strands of the case-law. The Full Court of the Court of Justice, that is a composition that is 
rarely convened and only for the most important issues, held in Pringle that the Charter is 
addressed to the EU institutions even when they act beyond the EU legal framework.103 It 
would be bizarre in the extreme for the Charter to apply to what the EU institutions do 
beyond the EU legal framework, but not within the CFSP framework.    
 
Having established that CFSP measures are governed by EU law on judicial protection and 
fundamental human rights under the current constitutional arrangements, the question of 
enforcement is raised for the cases where the Court has no jurisdiction under Article 24(1) 
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paragraph 2 TEU and Article 275 TFEU. This is where the role of national courts emerges. In 
fact, this brings us back to the very principle that underpins the logic of the broad approach 
adopted by the Court in Rosneft: the EU legal order provides for a complete system of 
remedies and procedures. Whilst it has been relied upon in order to extend the scope of the 
Court’s jurisdiction, this principle is, in fact, about two judicial actors, namely the CJEU and 
domestic courts. The role of the latter is stressed in Article 19(1) subparagraph 2 TEU which 
imposes on Member States a duty to ‘provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law’. Introduced at Lisbon in order to reflect prior 
case-law,104 this provision does not define the term ‘in the fields covered by Union law’ 
further. Its scope, therefore, does not rule out CFSP measures, neither is Article 19 TEU itself 
part of Title V TEU where the CFSP rules are laid down. Actions in relation to CFSP measures, 
therefore, are not excluded from Article 19 TEU in principle. This conclusion is also 
supported by Advocate General Kokott in her View in Opinion 2/13 where she argued that, 
‘in matters relating to the CFSP, effective legal protection for individuals is afforded partly 
by the Courts of the EU (second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU) and partly by national courts 
and tribunals (second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 274 TFEU)’.105 
 
National courts are, therefore, an intrinsic part of the Union’s judicial system and the 
remedies provided under national law are integrated in the EU’s system of remedies. This 
link has been a long-standing theme in the Court’s case-law. Not only is it encapsulated by 
the oft-repeated term ‘a complete system of legal remedies and procedures’,106 but it was 
also stressed in Opinion 1/09: drawing on Article 19(1) TEU, the Court referred to national 
courts, along with the CJEU, as ‘the guardians’ of the EU legal order107 and described the 
tasks attributed to them as ‘indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of the law 
established by the Treaties’.108 In fact, rather than exercising the right to grant such 
remedies, national courts are required to do so on the basis of the duty of cooperation 
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which binds all organs of the Member States pursuant to Article 4(3) TEU.109 Linking this role 
of national courts with the role of the Court of Justice, the latter held in Opinion 1/09 that ‘it 
is for the national courts and tribunals and for the Court of Justice to ensure the full 
application of European Union law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of 
an individual’s rights under that law’.110  
 
Whilst Article 24(1) paragraph 2 TEU and Article 275 TFEU restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice in CFSP, such restriction is not introduced, neither does it follow in relation 
to the jurisdiction of national courts. In fact, in the absence of access to the CJEU in CFSP 
matters, jurisdiction remains with the national court. This is also the position in relation to 
competence under Article 4(1) TEU which acknowledges that ‘competences not conferred 
upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’. There is no reason why a 
different principle should apply to jurisdiction.111 In the pithy words of Lenaerts and his co-
authors, ‘the Union courts do not have inherent jurisdiction just because matters of Union 
law are involved in a particular case. Instead, there must be a specific legal basis set down in 
the Treaties which delineates the extent of the Union courts’ power to adjudicate a 
particular case or cause of action. Consequently, everything falling outside of what the 
Treaties confer upon the Union courts falls within the residual competences of the national 
courts’.112  
 
This conclusion is borne out by Article 274 TFEU which refers expressly to actions involving 
the EU as a party that are not excluded from the jurisdiction of national courts.113 It also 
follows from the Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 47 of which provides that 
‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has 
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid 
down in this Article’. The wording of this provision is broad (‘a court’) and does not confine 
its application to the CJEU. It follows from the above that, in the absence of the jurisdiction 
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of the Court of Justice to rule on a dispute pertaining to CFSP pursuant to Article 25(1) 
paragraph 2 TEU and Article 275 TFEU, jurisdiction stays with domestic courts.114  
 
The analysis so far suggests that the broad approach to its jurisdiction that the Court has 
adopted is by no means essential in order to ensure compliance with the rule of law in CFSP. 
Put differently, a narrow construction of the Court’s jurisdiction, in accordance with the 
wording of the Treaties and the logic of the CFSP exclusion would not entail the absence of 
judicial review. National courts act as EU courts and apply EU law in actions against EU 
measures or national measures adopted within the scope of EU law. Such actions would be 
raised in different contexts. They may be direct: for instance, a private or legal person may 
bring an action against an EU institution before domestic courts seeking judicial review (a 
scenario provided for in Article 274 TFEU). They may also be indirect: for instance, a private 
or legal person may bring an action against national authorities for their implementation of 
CFSP measures, in the context of which the legality of the latter may be raised. After all, the 
provisions of the Charter are also addressed to the Member States ‘when they are 
implementing EU law’ pursuant to Article 51(1) Charter, a provision that has been construed 
broadly by the Court in order to cover any action by a Member State ‘within the scope of EU 
law’.115 Finally, actions for damages against the EU or the Member States may be brought 
before national courts.116 In such actions, the EU would not enjoy immunity.117  
 
Such actions before national courts raise certain questions. First, how intense is the review 
of the content of CFSP acts that national courts may exercise? Secondly, what is the effect 
of a judgment of a national court on the validity of a CFSP measure in the light of the Foto 
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Frost principle which prevents national courts from declaring EU measures invalid?118 
Thirdly, what standards are national courts to apply in the context of an action for 
damages?  
 
In cases where the EU’s judges have ruled in favour of the jurisdiction of domestic courts, 
they have not had to confront the above questions. The General Court, for instance, in Case 
T-271/10 H v Council (the judgment of which was set aside on appeal by the Court of Justice) 
had concluded that the domestic judges could rule on the legality of the contested measure 
and, if loss were established, award damages.119 This conclusion, however, did not raise any 
problems regarding the Foto Frost principle, as the General Court had already concluded 
that the contested measure was attributed not to the EU but the Italian State which had 
delegated to the Head of Mission powers over its seconded staff.   
 
What if attribution was not an issue? In other words, what could a national court do in the 
context of an action against a CFSP measure attributed properly to the EU but excluded 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice? In her View in Opinion 2/13, Advocate General 
Kokott argued that such courts could disapply a CFSP act in a particular dispute. Such 
approach would not run counter to the Foto-Frost principle, as, in her view, ‘in the context 
of the CFSP, the Court of Justice cannot claim its otherwise recognized monopoly on reviews 
of the legality of the activities of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The settled 
case-law of the Court, stemming from the judgment in Foto-Frost, … cannot, … in my view, 
be applied to the CFSP. Unlike in supranational areas of EU law, there is no general principle 
in the CFSP that only the Courts of the EU may review acts of the EU institutions as to their 
legality’.120 A somewhat more narrow approach is adopted by Advocate General Wahl in his 
Opinion in Case 455/14 P H where he argued that a national court could suspend the 
applicability of a CFSP act and award damages.121 It is recalled that it is settled case-law that 
a national court has the right to suspend the application of an EU measure provided that 
certain conditions are met, including a reference to the Court of Justice on the validity of the 
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contested measure.122 Advocate General Wahl added that, given that the Court has no 
jurisdiction to hear a reference, ‘it would then be for the EU institution responsible for the 
act to draw the necessary inferences from the decision of the national court; by repealing or 
amending the act whose application vis-à-vis the applicant has been suspended. To be clear: 
the decision of the national court on the lawfulness of an EU act does not, conversely, have 
effects erga omnes’.123 
 
The Foto-Frost principle about the Courts’ exclusive jurisdiction to declare EU law invalid 
was articulated in a legal context within which the Court had full jurisdiction. This, however, 
is clearly not the case in the field of CFSP. No matter how narrowly the CFSP exclusion is 
construed, there is a core of CFSP measures which are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. This 
was acknowledged expressly by the Court itself in Opinion 2/13.124 The scope, therefore, of 
the Foto-Frost principle should be adjusted accordingly in order to reflect the reduced 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. This adjustment would entail the decoupling of the 
principle from the exercise of review of EU law in this particular area, given the CFSP 
exclusion and the ensuing non-applicability of the preliminary reference procedure.125 In the 
light of the above, and the analysis of the role of domestic courts set out in this section, 
domestic judges have jurisdiction as a matter of EU law over questions of interpretation and 
validity of CFSP measures.   
  
Whilst the above argument follows from the CFSP exclusion, the central role of domestic 
courts in the EU legal order, and the overarching scope of the main tenets of EU law, such as 
the protection of fundamental human rights, its practical implications may appear to be 
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alarming: ‘uncontrolled proliferation of conflicting interpretations’126 and the disapplication 
of EU measures in different domestic legal contexts may ensue. This risk, however, is as 
inevitable as it is inherent in the position of CFSP in the Union’s constitutional system. First, 
the possibility of inconsistency in the interpretation and application of CFSP measures is an 
inherent part of the constitutional settlement reached by the drafters of the Treaties at 
Lisbon, and follows from the choice that the latter made about the limited jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice in CFSP. After all, even under the existing rules, national courts are 
prevented from relying upon the preliminary reference procedure for questions about the 
validity and interpretation of CFSP acts in general (that is except for decisions providing for 
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons).127  
 
Secondly, a degree of uncertainty is not alien to the functioning of the EU legal order. After 
all, the very foundation of EU law, that is the principle of supremacy, is applied by national 
constitutional courts somewhat conditionally: on the one hand, there is an overall 
qualification in Germany about the protection of fundamental human rights, and, on the 
other hand, it is the on-going acceptance by the national legislatures, rather than the case-
law of the Court of Justice on the inherent characteristics of the EU, that is central to the 
application of supremacy by domestic courts.128 Messiness, therefore, and the constant 
prospect of upsetting the delicate constitutional balance between EU and national law is a 
challenge with which the EU legal order is familiar as a matter of practice.  
 
Thirdly, the CFSP case is not the first legal context within which the drafters of the Treaties 
have accepted the possibility of inconsistent interpretations of EU law. The Amsterdam 
Treaty, for instance, had introduced a variation on the preliminary reference procedure in 
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the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters whereby Member States 
could choose to confine the right to refer to courts of last resort.129 
 
Fourthly, even if the EU were reluctant to acknowledge the role of national courts in CFSP, 
the latter might well be willing to assume it on their own accord. If anything, the German 
Solange experience suggests that the idea of an area of EU activity not subject to judicial 
review would be intolerable to national courts, let alone contrary to the general principles 
of EU law pursuant to Article 6(3) TEU. 
 
Whilst the risk of inconsistency is the inevitable consequence of the system of judicial 
supervision in the field of CFSP as set out in the Treaties, the sense of alarm that it appears 
to generate may be exaggerated. It does not follow, for instance, that domestic courts 
would be keen to interfere unduly with the conduct of CFSP. A case in point is an action 
about the capture, detention and transfer of nine suspected Somalian pirates, in the context 
of the EU’s anti-piracy Operation Atalanta,130 by German personnel to the Kenyan 
authorities for criminal proceedings and sentencing in 2009. This action was brought before 
the Administrative Court of Cologne and, on appeal, the Obervelwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-
Westfalen. Whilst in principle the Appeal Court accepted that the EU was responsible for the 
Operation in principle, it attributed the contested act to the German authorities in the light 
of the circumstances of the case, and held that the surrender of the suspected pirates to 
Kenya had been unlawful and in violation of Article 3 ECHR.131 In this case, therefore, no EU 
measure was struck down, as national courts focused on and invalidated a domestic 
measure, albeit in the context of an EU operation.  
 
It does not follow, of course, that national courts would always confine themselves to 
reviewing national measures, neither is it suggested that they should. After all, in reviewing 
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CFSP acts, national courts act as EU courts.132 This proposition, however, also suggests that 
national courts are bound by the duty of cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU.133 While the 
latter requires that they carry out judicial review of CFSP measures in order to ensure 
compliance with fundamental human rights, it also suggests that, in doing so, national 
courts ought to take into account the effectiveness of EU law.134 Viewed from this angle, 
striking down CFSP measures would not become a tool likely to be abused.135 In other 
words, the role of national judges in this field may not be carried out independently of the 




This article made three main arguments. First, the CFSP exclusion from the Court’s 
jurisdiction should be taken seriously, as it reflects the constitutional ambivalence that 
characterises the position of CFSP in the Union’s legal order. Secondly, by interpreting the 
CFSP exclusion narrowly and the exceptions laid down in Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275 
TFEU broadly, the case-law of the Court of Justice has adopted an integrationist approach 
that does not reflect accurately either the wording of primary law or the spirit of the system 
of judicial review that the drafters of the Treaties set out for this policy area. Thirdly, the 
approach adopted by this case-law is not the only way to ensure that the Union’s foreign 
and security policy is carried out in accordance with the rule of law: domestic courts are an 
essential part of the CFSP system laid down in primary law, and their role has been unduly 
ignored. 
 
Effective judicial review in the area of CFSP requires a leap of faith. So far, it has been the 
case-law of the Court of Justice that has suggested that the other EU institutions and the 
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Member States show faith: the broad approach to the scope of its jurisdiction in CFSP is 
accompanied by low intensity of judicial review and deference to the discretion of the 
Union’s decision-makers. It, therefore, appears to reassure the latter that the Union’s 
Judges would be reluctant to unravel the carefully negotiated arrangements reached in 
areas of considerable  political sensitivity. This article proposed a different leap of faith: it is 
high time that the Court of Justice acknowledged the role of domestic courts and recognised 
them as a central locus of judicial review in the field. In doing so, the Court would be faithful 
to the wording of the Treaties and the choices of their drafters about judicial supervision of 
CFSP measures. It would also grant ‘the powerhouse’ of EU law136 a role commensurate to 
the central position that Member States have in the conduct of CFSP. Finally, it would show 
confidence in the maturity of the EU legal order and the effectiveness of its decentralised 
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